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Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in
Negligence Actions
Courts have generally held the mentally ill defendant to the same objec-
tive standard of tort liability as an average defendant.1 In contrast, courts
have often relied on a subjective standard to find mentally ill plaintiffs
incapable of contributory negligence. In the past two decades, critics have
argued that in light of dramatic changes in society's conceptualization and
treatment of the mentally ill,2 the objective standard is no longer appro-
priate and courts should apply a subjective standard to both mentally ill
defendants and mentally ill plaintiffs. The consensus of recent opinion
1. Tort liability for negligence is determined by employing a "reasonable person" standard. Negli-
gence is generally defined as the failure "to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a reasonable and prudent man would not do." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 930 (5th ed. 1979).
An objective standard makes no allowances for a particular individual's capacities or idiosyncracies.
Under an objective standard, a mentally ill person is liable for any tort for which a "normal" person
would be held liable. Under a subjective standard, however, a person's conduct is judged in light of
that particular individual's qualities and abilities rather than those possessed by the "reasonable per-
son." A subjective standard would take into account a person's mental illness and hold the person to a
less stringent standard of tort liability than that for a normal person. If a person's mental illness were
sufficiently severe to prevent him from exercising "reasonable care," then he would not be found
liable for negligence in cases where the average person would be held liable. Thus, the subjective
standard may be said to afford, in practice, a defense or type of immunity to tort liability. See gener-
ally Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1927) (discussing merits of
objective versus subjective standards of negligence).
2. The reforms in mental health law over the past two decades have generated substantial litiga-
tion and legislation governing the rights of the mentally ill. The use of involuntary commitment has
been of particular concern. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (no constitu-
tional basis for involuntary confinement of the mentally ill if they are not dangerous and can live
safely in the community); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (defining constitutional limits on
involuntary civil commitment of persons found incompetent to stand trial). See generally Develop-
ments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190 (1974) (review of
case law and statutory developments); Note, Procedural Safeguards for Periodic Review: A New Com-
mitment to Mental Patients' Rights, 88 YALE L.J. 850 (1979) (discussing procedural protections for
limiting the duration of involuntary hospitalization).
3. See Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Deficient, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 52,74
(1960) (critique of tort law based on "analysis of modern psychiatric classifications of mental illness,"
asserting need to base tort liability on factors related to specific mental illnesses); Ellis, Tort Responsi-
bility of Mentally Disabled Persons, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1079, 1107-09 (1981) (asserting
need to adopt either subjective standard or new defense of objective standard since policy rationales
supporting current tort standards for mentally ill have become questionable in light of recent scientific
and legal developments); Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence
Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17,
38-44 (1981) (concluding that tort standard for mentally ill is "almost facially unfathomable" and
arguing for adoption of subjective standard); Comment, The Tort Liability of Insane Persons for
Negligence: A Critique, 39 TENN. L. Rav. 705, 723 (1972) (common law position should be rejected
because of unsound policy grounds and replaced with "disorientation" rule). But see Alexander &
Szasz, Mental Illness as an Excuse for Civil Wrongs, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 24 (1967) (objective
standard appropriate since mental illness a "myth").
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appears to support this proposed adoption of a subjective standard in "pri-
mary" negligence cases. 4
In contrast, this Note will argue that current mental health policy,
treatment, and research indicate that an objective standard is more appro-
priate for the mentally ill.5 This objective standard should be used for
both mentally ill plaintiffs and defendants to obtain consistency in the law
and fairness in policy.
I. THE TORT LAW ON NEGLIGENCE AND THE MENTALLY ILL
There has been continuing controversy and uncertainty regarding the
appropriate standards of tort liability for the mentally ill. At common law,
mentally ill defendants are held to an objective standard to determine lia-
bility, whereas mentally ill plaintiffs are held to a subjective standard to
determine contributory negligence.
A. Primary Negligence
The issue of the tort liability of the mentally ill was still unresolved in
the United States in the early 1900's.' Existing English cases presented
conflicting authority, and contemporary commentators had adopted diver-
gent opinions on the state of the law.' Only one American case, Williams
v. Hays,8 had considered the issue, and held that a mentally ill person was
liable for negligence. Unfortunately, both the reasoning and principle of
Hays were obscured by numerous appeals, reversals, and retrials.9
4. "Primary" negligence occurs when the mentally ill person is the tortfeasor. "Contributory"
negligence occurs when the mentally ill plaintiff negligently contributes to his own injuries.
5. This Note addresses only the tort liability of the mentally ill, focusing on the chronically men-
tally ill-those persons who may live in the community but who throughout their lives will require
intermittent or continual medication, psychotherapy, or brief hospitalization. The Note does not ex-
amine cases involving the mentally retarded or persons suffering from organic brain dysfunctions.
The case law concerning tort liability of the mentally ill often makes no distinction between inten-
tional and negligent torts. In some cases, however, the mentally ill have not been held liable for torts
reqqiring malicious intent, such as defamation, and courts generally disallow punitive damages
against mentally ill defendants. For a thorough review of the case law broken down by type of tort,
see Curran, supra note 3, at 54-63.
6. See Hornblower, Insanity and the Law of Negligence, 5 COLUm. L. REv. 278, 278 (1905) ("It
is a singular fact and one not altogether creditable to our jurisprudence, . . . that in this Twentieth
Century, the question of the liability of an insane person for tortious conduct. . . should remain to a
large extent an open question.").
7. For an historical review of case authority and statements of the law by early textwriters, see
Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 Mscs. L. REv. 9 (1924); Hornblower,
supra note 6.
8. 143 N.Y. 442, 38 N.E. 449 (1894), later appealed, 157 N.Y. 541, 52 N.E. 589 (1899). This
case became the most frequently cited authority for holding the mentally ill liable for their torts. See
Ague, The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions, 60 Dicx. L. REv. 211, 215 (1956). The case
continues to be cited in more recent cases. See Kaczer v. Marrero, 324 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976); Barylski v. Paul, 38 Mich. App. 614, 616, 196 N.W.2d 868, 869 (1972).
9. An insurer's subrogee sued the captain of a ship that went down in a storm. The plaintiff
charged the captain with negligence in failing to acknowledge obvious damage to the ship's rudder
post and in declining two offers of help from passing ships. The captain pleaded in response that he
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The confusion over the proper standard of tort liability for the mentally
ill was reflected in the American Law Institute's Restatements. The first
Restatement of Torts, published in 1934, stated that a "reasonable person"
standard should be employed unless the actor is an "insane person."'
The Restatement expressed no opinion as to whether insane persons
should be held to the objective reasonable person standard." The 1948
Supplement deleted this exception,"2 explaining that while there had been
insufficient authority in 1934 on which to base a definitive rule, enough
authority existed by 1948 to hold the insane to an objective standard."3
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1965, unequivocally
stated that the mentally ill were to be held liable for their torts."4 With
only a few modern exceptions, 5 the courts have consistently adhered to
this common law rule.' 6 A few states have incorporated it into their
had remained continually on the bridge for 48 hours during the storm and that upon finally retiring
he had taken quinine for his malaria. He claimed that exhaustion and quinine impaired his faculties
and he could not be held responsible for his actions when called back to the bridge after problems
with the rudder post developed. At the first trial, the jury was instructed that the captain, if found
insane, was not guilty of negligence. The jury found for the captain. The court of appeals reversed,
stating that the captain would not be negligent only if his insanity were solely the result of his efforts
to save the ship. A new trial resulted in a directed verdict for the plaintiff. The court of appeals again
reversed, holding that it was error for the trial court to find the captain liable regardless of whether
his actions were the result of exhaustion. After this reversal the plaintiffs dropped the case. For a
thorough discussion of the case, including extensive quotations, see Hornblower, supra note 6, at
284-93. See also Wilkinson, Mental Incompetency as a Defense to Tort Liability, 17 ROCKY MTN. L.
REV. 38, 43 (1944) ("Williams '. Hays is filled with the drama of the sea, but it is not very enlight-
ening as to the law of the land.").
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 283 (1934).
11. A caveat stated: "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether insane persons are required
to conform to the standard of behaviour which society demands of sane persons for the protection of
the interests of others." Id. at 744.
12. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 283 (Supp. 1948).
13. See id. at 658. The additional cases decided between 1934 and 1948 were relatively few and
dealt primarily with intentional torts. See, e.g., McGuire v. Almy, 297 Mass. 323, 8 N.E.2d 760
(1937) (battery); Van Vooren v. Cook, 273 A.D. 88, 75 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1947) (same). The Restate-
ment cites only one additional case where a mentally ill person was held liable for negligence. RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 283, at 654 (Supp. 1948) (citing Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 150 Misc.
180, 268 N.Y.S. 446 (Mun. Ct. 1934) (bus driver became suddenly insane and collided with plain-
tiff)). The reporters, however, state that the language in the opinions holding the mentally ill liable
for intentional torts is phrased broadly enough to include liability for negligence. Id.
14. "Unless the actor is a child, his insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor
from liability for conduct which does not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under like
circumstances." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965).
15. See infra p. 160.
16. For a review of the case law and breakdown of liability for particular torts, see Curran, supra
note 3, at 54-63; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 40-52; Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 189 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
For the most recent cases reported supporting the common law view, see, e.g., Turner v. Caldwell, 36
Conn. Supp. 350, 421 A.2d 876 (Super. Ct. 1980) (insanity not a defense to claim of negligent opera-
tion of a motor vehicle); Jolley v. Powell, 299 So. 2d 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (defense of
mental illness not available in wrongful death action predicated upon unintentional tort); Kuhn v.
Zabotsky, 9 Ohio St. 2d 129, 224 N.E.2d 137 (1967) (insanity not a defense to claim of negligently
operating a motor vehicle); Schumann v. Crofoot, 43 Or. App. 53, 602 P.2d 298 (1979) (defendant's
mental state not a defense to a claim of negligence).
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statutes.
17
Courts have traditionally given four rationales for holding the mentally
ill to an objective standard of tort liability. The most common is that the
mentally ill should be required to compensate the victims of any damage
they cause."' A second frequently cited rationale is that a defense of
mental illness raises evidentiary problems because of the difficulty of de-
termining the existence and degree of mental illness and because of the
possibility of a person's feigning mental illness.1 9 The two remaining ra-
tionales are less persuasive and have been given decreasing attention by
the courts. One, cited mostly in early cases, is that holding the mentally ill
liable will encourage their caretakers to exercise greater diligence in
preventing them from committing torts.2 0 The other is that the difficulty
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 41 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-711 (1979); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-10-03 (1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 25-26 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 27A-2-4 (1976).
Louisiana follows the civil law rule which recognizes mental illness as a defense to tort liability.
Yancey v. Maestri, 155 So. 509 (La. Ct. App. 1934); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2319 (West 1979).
18. See, e.g., Turner, 36 Conn. Supp. at 351, 421 A.2d at 877 (Super. Ct. 1980); Kaczer v.
Marrero, 324 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976);Jolley, 299 So. 2d at 649; Seals v. Snow,
123 Kan. 88, 90, 254 P. 348, 349 (1927); Vosnos v. Perry, 43 Ill. App. 3d 834, 837, 357 N.E.2d 614,
615 (1976); Kuhn, 9 Ohio St. 2d at 134, 224 N.E.2d at 141 (1967). Compare Comment, supra note
3, at 715 (compensation rationale "strongest" of those supporting rule) with Ague, supra note 8, at
221 (rationale has "least merit").
19. See, e.g., Turner, 36 Conn. Supp. at 351, 421 A.2d at 877; Vosnos, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 837,
357 N.E.2d at 616. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B comment b (1965)
(stating rationale); Comment, supra note 3, at 711 n.43 (listing additional cases citing rationale). The
Restatement (Second) acknowledges both sides of the controversy: "Although this factor may be of
decreasing importance with the continued development of medical and psychiatric science, it remains
at the present time a major obstacle to any allowance for mental deficiency." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 283B comment b(2). Such evidence of mental capacity, however, is allowed not
only in criminal cases but also in certain civil actions, such as guardianship, civil commitment, and
testamentary capacity. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 1089.
Empirical studies of diagnostic reliability present conflicting results. Compare Ennis & Litwack,
Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
693 (1974) (citing empirical evidence of unreliability of diagnoses) and Rosenhan, On Being Sane in
hisane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973) (describing unreliability of diagnoses) with A. STONE,
MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 65-66 (1975) (providing evidence that
state of diagnostic art has improved) and Helzer, Clayton, Pambakian, Reich, Woodruff & Reveley,
Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis II: The Test/Retest Reliability of Diagnostic Classification, 34
ARCWvRS GEN. PSYCHIATRY 136 (1977) (empirical support for reliability of diagnoses). Since such
diagnostic evidence is admissible in other types of proceedings, it would seem a stronger rationale is
needed for disallowing a defense of mental illness in tort actions. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 1089-90.
20. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 664, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (1887); Seals v. Snow, 123
Kan. 88, 90, 254 P. 348, 349 (1927). Even proponents of the existing law agree that the rationale of
encouraging caretakers to be more diligent is unsupportable. See Alexander & Szasz, supra note 3, at
35-36 (although mentally ill should be held liable for their torts, caretaker rationale is outdated). One
commentator argues that, rather than attempting to make guardians more responsible, the courts tend
to excuse guardians. See Ague, supra note 8, at 222-24. Some have suggested that there are more
powerful incentives for guardians or families to restrain the actions of the mentally ill: concern for the
person's welfare, concern for their own safety or that of others, and embarrassment. See Ellis, supra
note 3, at 1084-85. Moreover, if the purpose were truly to make guardians more responsible, then it
would be more effective to impose liability directly for negligent supervision. Finally, this rationale
was advanced at a time when the mentally ill were primarily taken care of or confined by the family
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of distinguishing between mental illness and other variations in emotional,
intellectual, or physical make-up would ultimately result in a complete
erosion of the objective standard.21
B. Contributory Negligence
In contrast to the use of the objective standard in primary negligence
cases, the overwhelming majority of courts have held that a completely
insane person is incapable of contributory negligence and that lesser de-
grees of mental impairment, not amounting to complete insanity, may be
considered by the jury in determining whether the plaintiff is guilty of
contributory negligence. 22 A minority of courts have held that although
completely insane persons cannot be held contributorily negligent, no
lesser degrees of mental impairment may be considered.23
No policy reasons for this distinction between primary and contributory
negligence standards have ever been clearly articulated. Several factors,
however, have been suggested. First, there is a vague supposition that the
policy rationales supporting an objective standard in primary negligence
cases have less force in cases of contributory negligence. 24 Second, there
seems to be less equitable discomfort in allowing mentally ill plaintiffs to
recover 25 since the mentally ill victim appears less threatening and more
deserving of sympathy than a mentally ill tortfeasor who causes an in-
jury.26 Third, the doctrine of contributory negligence is widely considered
or in institutions. Today most mentally ill persons live in the community and are neither living with
their families nor under the supervision of others. See infra note 58.
21. See, e.g.,Jolley, 299 So. 2d at 648; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B comment b(1)
(1965).
22. See Baltimore & P. R.R. v. Cumberland, 176 U.S. 232, 238 (1900); Snider v. Callahan, 250
F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1966); DeMartini v. Alexander Sanitarium, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d
442, 447-48, 13 Cal. Rptr. 564, 566-67 (1961); Young v. State, 92 Misc. 2d 795, 796-97, 401
N.Y.S.2d 955, 956-57 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Feldman v. Howard, 5 Ohio App. 2d 65, 68, 214 N.E.2d 235,
237 (1966). See generally Note, Contributory Negligence of Incompetents, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 215
(1964) (reviewing case law with respect to varying degrees of mental illness and contributory negli-
gence); Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 393 (1963 & Supps. 1979, 1982) (reviewing case law involving mentally
ill and contributory negligence).
23. See Worthington & Co. v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 310, 315-16, 11 So. 72, 73-74 (1892); Fox v. City
and County of San Francisco, 47 Cal. App. 3d 164, 171-74, 120 Cal. Rptr. 779, 783-85 (1975);
Johnson v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 16 La. App. 464, 468, 135 So. 114, 115 (1931). See generally Note,
supra note 22, at 217-19 (discussing minority position); Annot., supra note 22, at 405 (discussing
view of courts refusing to consider less than total insanity).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 comment g (1965). This may be true with
regard to the compensation rationale; holding the mentally ill incapable of contributory negligence
does not have the undesirable result of denying compensation to innocent victims. The evidentiary
problems of determining the existence of mental illness, however, remain. See Ellis, supra note 3, at
1091. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 comment f (standard of care required for
protection of oneself may differ from standard of care required for protection of others).
25. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 1091-92.
26. See id. at 1092.
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to be too harsh; this approach thus provides a means of avoiding some
harsh results."'
No court appears to have formulated a new standard of care for men-
tally ill plaintiffs in states which have abandoned the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence in favor of comparative negligence.25 In comparative fault
states, the courts have been willing merely to carry over their approach
under contributory negligence. 9
C. Criticisms of the Law
Legal commentators have criticized the common law doctrine of holding
the mentally ill liable for their torts since its inception." The first criti-
cisms appeared in the early 1900's, apparently in response to the case of
Williams v. Hays 1 and to various commentators who declared the doc-
trine a settled principle of law. 2 These early critics claimed that it was
27. See id. at 1091; Comment, supra note 3, at 722. The doctrine of contributory negligence is
considered overly harsh because any negligence on the plaintiff's part bars recovery even though the
defendant's negligence may have substantially caused the injury. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 433 (4th ed. 1971).
28. There are two forms of comparative negligence. Under "pure" comparative negligence, no
matter how great the plaintiff's contributory negligence is in comparison with the defendant's negli-
gence, the plaintiff is not barred from recovery. Under "modified" comparative negligence, the plain-
tiff will be permitted partial recovery (fault is apportioned) so long as the plaintiff's contributory
negligence was "not as great as" or "no greater than" the defendant's negligence. See M. FRANILIN,
INJURIES AND REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES § 4, at 324
(1979); W. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 67, at 436-37.
Very little has been written on the contributory negligence of the mentally ill. See Note, supra note
22. The one commentary which does discuss the issues of contributory and comparative negligence
suggests the doctrinal basis for the objective standard is further weakened in comparative negligence
states. Ellis, supra note 3, at 1098. The author argues that: (1) under comparative negligence, cost is
apportioned on the basis of fault, and the standard is thus incompatible with holding the mentally ill
liable since they are faultless; and (2) comparative negligence makes the incongruity of treating men-
tally ill plaintiffs and defendants differently more visible and more difficult to justify, and presents
awkward problems for juries trying to allocate responsibility. Ellis, supra note 3, at 1096-98.
29. See Miller v. Trinity Medical Center, 260 N.W.2d 4 (N.D. 1977); Warner v. Kiowa County
Hosp. Auth., 551 P.2d 1179 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
30. Almost every decade since 1900, one or two commentaries have been published criticizing the
law. See, e.g., Hornblower, supra note 6 (1905); Ames, Lau, and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97
(1908); Cook, Mental Deficiency in Relation to Tort, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 333 (1921); Bohlen, supra
note 7 (1924); Wilkinson, supra note 9 (1944); Note, Torts: Liability of an Insane Defendant, 34
CORNELL L. REV. 274 (1948); Ague, supra note 8 (1956); Curran, supra note 3 (1960); Comment,
supra note 3 (1972). For the two most recent critiques, both of which appeared in 1981, see Ellis,
supra note 3; Seidelson, supra note 3.
Only one article unequivocally supports holding the mentally ill to an objective standard of tort
liability. See Alexander & Szasz, supra note 3. The authors conclude that the mentally ill should be
held liable for their torts on the grounds that there is no such thing as mental illness and that giving
the mentally ill tort immunity would facilitate the exercise of social control over the mentally ill. But
cf. Seidelson, supra note 3, at 45-46 (vulnerability of mentally ill to formal adjudications of incompe-
tency or commitment supports affording a subjective standard).
31. 143 N.Y. 442, 38 N.E. 449 (1894), later appealed, 157 N.Y. 541, 52 N.E. 589 (1899).
32. Bohlen, supra note 7; Cook, supra note 30; Hornblower, supra note 6. These three early
commentators cited the ambiguities of the holding in Williams v. Hays, the lack of other authority,
and the conflicting opinions of various textwriters as evidence that the issue of the tort liability of the
mentally ill had not been definitively settled. They argued that it was inappropriate to hold the men-
tally ill liable for their torts. These early critiques helped keep the ALI from taking a position on the
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inconsistent with justice and reason to hold the mentally ill liable for their
torts. Such liability purportedly violated the fault principle since the men-
tally ill could not control their actions and thus were morally blameless.38
As society's views of the mentally ill changed, calls for reform of the
common law tort doctrine became more squarely grounded in social policy
arguments. Critics assert that, given psychiatric and legal advances, it is
no longer justifiable for society to hold the mentally ill to a tort standard
impossible for them to meet." Since the mentally ill are in this view inca-
pable of conforming to a "reasonable person" standard, these commenta-
tors argue that holding the mentally ill liable for their torts violates the
fault principle and imposes strict liability upon them without sound
justification.35
Critics have faulted each of the traditional rationales for the objective
standard. They contend that psychiatry and psychology can now provide
reasonably reliable diagnoses, thus minimizing evidentiary problems.3"
Critics attack the law's denying a defense of mental illness simply because
a few "normal" persons may attempt to feign mental illness as unnecessa-
rily harsh toward the mentally ill,"7 especially since "normal persons"
would be unlikely to feign such a defense because of the stigma associated
tort liability of the mentally ill in its first draft of the Restatement of Torts. See Comment, supra note
3, at 710-11.
As of the mid-1900's, critics were still asserting that the doctrine of holding the mentally ill liable
for their torts rested on weak and inconsistent case authority. See Ague, supra note 8, at 224-28
(recommending that a "perpetual lunacy commission" of mental health professionals in each court
district determine whether a person was sane enough to be held liable in tort); Wilkinson, supra note
9, at 57 (suggesting courts deduce general principles of law and use advances in modern psychology
and psychiatry to articulate the types of mental deficiencies which can or cannot be considered in
particular tort cases).
33. See Bohlen, supra note 7, at 31-34; Cook, supra note 30, at 349-50.
34. See Curran, supra note 3, at 66-74 (urging development of theories of liability that incorpo-
rate modern psychiatric knowledge of the relationship between various mental disorders and conduct);
Comment, supra note 3, at 723 (psychiatry now sufficiently advanced to develop a M'Naughten-type
rule "separating the gravely insane from those with mental illness not clearly indicating inability to
use due care"). A recent commentator suggests that application of the objective standard to mentally
ill defendants is a remnant of the era when society sought to confine all mentally ill persons, and that
adoption of a subjective standard would represent a "modest step" toward the equitable treatment of
the mentally ill consistent with other advances in their legal status. Ellis, supra note 3, at 1108-09.
35. Curran, supra note 3, at 65; Ellis, supra note 3, at 1081-84; Seidelson, supra note 3, at 38
n.85. Some critics contend that if the law is primarily or exclusively concerned with compensating
victims, then negligence should be eliminated in favor of strict liability in all cases. See Comment,
supra note 3, at 716. The rebirth of strict liability in tort law, based on efficient allocation of losses to
those who can best bear the cost, id. at 716-17, does not support strict liability for the mentally ill
since they are rarely better able to bear the cost or to redistribute their loss on the public.
36. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 1086-90, 1107 (while evidentiary problems have not been elimi-
nated, diagnoses are reliable in some cases, and evidentiary problems would be no greater than those
encountered in other types of proceedings involving mental competency); Comment, supra note 3, at
715 (diagnoses are reliable at least in cases of severe mental illness); see also supra note 19 (studies of
diagnostic reliability).
37. See Ague, supra note 8, at 221-22; Comment, supra note 3, at 714-15.
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with mental illness. 8 Moreover, critics respond to the potential erosion of
the objective standard by noting that exceptions to the objective standard
of liability. have already been created with respect to children and the
physically disabled. 9 Finally, a few courts have reconsidered or rejected
the common law doctrine.40
II. AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD IS CONSISTENT WITH CURRENT
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT POLICY
Commentators have argued that recent changes in the medical and legal
treatment of the mentally ill indicate that a subjective standard should be
adopted. The shift from institutionalization to community treatment, how-
ever, suggests the appropriateness of the objective standard.
A. Deinstitutionalization and Community Mental Health Treatment
The most dramatic change in the mental health field in the past two
decades has been the move from institutionalization to community treat-
ment.41 Deinstitutionalization attempts to reintegrate the mentally ill as
38. See Ellis, supra note 3, at 1087; Seidelson, supra note 3, at 39.
39. The most complete discussion of the analogies between the mentally ill and the physically
disabled or children is Ellis, supra note 3, at 1098-1106.
The standard of care for a physically disabled person is generally that of a reasonable person
"under like disability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C (1965). The major rationales for
applying a subjective standard to the physically disabled are the greater public familiarity with and
acceptance of the physically disabled, and the ease and certainty with which physical disabilities may
be proven. Id. comment b.
Generally, children are held to a standard of conduct reasonable for a child "of like age, intelli-
gence, and experience." Id. § 283A. This standard is justified by a greater public interest and sympa-
thy towards the welfare of children, and the wide basis of community experience for determining what
can be expected of them. Id. comment b..
It has been suggested that the mentally ill have not been similarly afforded the benefit of a subjec-
tive standard due to outdated ideas of the "grave threat" the mentally ill pose to society. See Ellis,
supra note 3, at 1086.
40. FitzGerald v. Lawhorn, 29 Conn. Supp. 511, 513, 294 A.2d 338, 339 (C.P. 1972) ("This
court is not willing to accept the majority point of view. It appears to be an outdated point of view.").
Although FitzGerald involved an intentional tort, the language in the opinion may be construed as
allowing mental illness as a viable defense to negligent torts, as recognized in Turner v. Caldwell, 36
Conn. Supp. 350, 350, 421 A.2d 876, 876 (Super. Ct. 1980). The Turner court, however, declined to
follow the dicta in FitzGerald. Id. at 351, 421 A.2d at 877.
The doctrine has also been reconsidered in cases where a defense of mental illness has been allowed
at the trial level but then overturned on appeal by the plaintiff. Vosnos v. Perry, 43 Ill. App. 3d 834,
837, 357 N.E.2d 614, 615 (1976) (affirmative defense of insanity overturned by appellate court hold-
ing that even if it was "incongruous" to hold insane persons liable, such liability provided compensa-
tion to innocent victims and prevented defendants from feigning mental illness); Kuhn v. Zabotsky, 9
Ohio St. 2d 129, 134, 224 N.E.2d 137, 141 (1967) (trial court erred in allowing defense of sudden
insanity); see also Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173 N.W. 2d 619 (1970)
(no liability for torts committed as result of sudden and unforeseeable onset of insanity). It remains to
be seen whether Breunig represents a turning point in the common law or merely an exception for
sudden insanity.
41. Support for a move from institutional to community treatment of the mentally ill first ap-
peared in the mid-1950's, grew during the 1960's,.and remains widespread today. See Morrissey,
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self-sufficient members of the community, by establishing community
mental health centers and community programs. Community treatment is
thought to reduce the time patients spend hospitalized;42 to reduce read-
mission rates by providing alternate services in the community; and to
allow chronic patients to return to the community, where they are likely
to be happier and better adjusted.'3
Although deinstitutionalization was the result of a confluence of several
forces,44 its initial impetus came from works published during the 1950's
and 1960's describing the harmful effects of institutionalization. 45 These
commentators suggested that hospitalization was actually detrimental to
patients, serving to decrease rather than increase their capacities to func-
tion in the outside world.4' The most frequently cited problems were
stigma,'47 dependency, 4" isolation,' 9 and degeneration.50 Commentators ar-
Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Ill: Process, Outcomes, and Neu' Directions, in DEVIANCE AND
MENTAL ILLNESS 147, 148-49 (W. Gove ed. 1982); Wagenfeld & Jacobs, The Community Mental
Health Movement: Its Origins and Growth, in PUBLIC MENrAL HEALTH 46, 63-64 (M. Wagenfield,
P. Lemkau & B. Justice eds. 1982); Williams, Bellis & Wellington, Deinstitutionalization and Social
Poliy: Historical Perspectives and Present Dilemmas, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 54, 61-62
(1980).
Increased public and professional concern over the treatment of the mentally ill led Congress to pass
the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963,
Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2689 (1976 & Supp. IV
1981)), which provided federal support for local mental health care. Since 1963, there has been an
increasing trend toward deinstitutionalization. The Mental Health Systems Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9401
(Supp. IV 1981), passed in 1980, is aimed at further facilitating the integration of the mentally ill into
the community and community-based treatment programs.
42. Although the general population of the nation has increased, the inpatient population of
mental institutions has decreased from a peak of 558,922 in 1955 to 137,810 in 1979. DIvisioN OF
BIOMETRY AND EPIDEMIOLOGY, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, PROVISIONAL PA-
TIENT MOVEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA ON STATE AND COUNTY MENTAL HOSPITALS:
1950-1979 (1981).
43. See Greenblatt and Glazier, The Phasing Out of Mental Hospitals in the United States, 132
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1135, 1135 (1975).
44. Only a brief overview is presented here. For more extensive coverage, see B. BLOOM, COM-
MUNITY MENTAL HEALTH (1975); R. LEIFER, IN THE NAME OF MENTAL HEALTH (1969);
Klerman, Better But Not Well: Social and Ethical Issues in Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill,
3 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 617 (1977); Williams, Bellis & Wellington, supra note 41. But see A.
SCULL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT: A RADICAL VIEW (1977)
(questioning traditional reasons for deinstitutionalization movement).
45. See R. BARTON, INSTITUTIONAL NEUROSIS (2d ed. 1966) (suggesting institutionalization it-
self causes a type of psychiatric disorder); I. BELKNAP, HUMAN PROBLEMS OF A STATE MENTAL
HOSPITAL (1956) (generally describing negative effects of conditions in state mental hospitals); A.
DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (1939) (historical review of treatment methods conclud-
ing that contemporary institutional treatment is national disgrace); E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961)
(leading work discussing sociological characteristics and effects on patients of "total institutions").
46. The term "institutional neurosis" refers to a disorder which often results from long-term insti-
tutionalization. The neurosis is characterized by apathy, loss of initiative, lack of ability to plan for
the future, deterioration in personal habits, loss of individuality, and resigned acceptance. See R.
BARTON, INSTITUTIONAL NEUROSIS 2-3 (3d ed. 1976); see also Kantor & Gelineau, Making Chroic
Schizophrenics, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 54 (1969) (empirical evidence that institutional treatment of
chronic schizophrenics was antitherapeutic and reinforced their deviant adaptation).
47. See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 45, at 355.
48. See id. at 358-61, 380-81. Goffman suggests that the regimentation and freedom from daily
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gued that the long-term, isolated hospital patient tended to forget how to
interact normally with others. The patient also became dependent on the
routine, structured environment and services provided by the institution.
Discharged long-term patients were often unable to perform simple but
necessary daily routines, such as handling money, shopping for groceries,
cooking meals, and getting dressed."1 Institutional care, rather than pre-
paring people to return to a place in the outside world, was teaching them
to become chronic patients.52 Moreover, as criticisms of institutional care
escalated, newly introduced psychotropic medications facilitated non-insti-
tutional care by reducing the incidence of florid psychotic symptoms
among patients. 3 Finally, some observers suggest, the move toward dein-
stitutionalization was also aided by the economic growth, political liber-
alism, and jnterest in civil rights that began during the early 1960's.54
Although there has been some discrepancy between promise and per-
formance,55 the consensus of opinion appears to be that community treat-
responsibilities reduces the patient's present insecurities, but only at the cost of the patient's later
ability to function.
49. See R. BARTON, supra note 46, at 8-9, 16-18; E. GOFFMAN, supra note 45, at 356.
50. See R. BARTON, supra note 46, at 2-3.
51. See id. at 9. Barton suggests that hospitals should treat institutional neurosis by providing
programs to teach or redevelop social skills, household management skills, recreational abilities, and
personal care routines. Id. at 22-44; see also Anthony, Cohen & Vitalo, The Measurement of Rehabil-
itation Outcome, 4 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 365, 379 (1978) (training in skills needed to function in
community and community support services are most important factors affecting rehabilitation
outcome).
52. See R. BARTON, supra note 46, at 20-21; E. GOFFMAN, supra note 45, at 378-79.
53. Psychotropic medications are drugs that alter a person's mood, thought, or behavior. The
three major types of psychotropic medications are tranquilizers, antidepressants, and stimulants. See
Baiter & Levine, The Nature and Extent of Psychotropic Drug Usage in the United States, 5
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGICAL BULL. 3 (1969) (listing types of drugs, their purposes and effects, and
extent of usage). Psychotropic medications make it possible to control and limit patients' overt mani-
festations of deviant symptoms and behavior, thus reducing or eliminating the need for hospitalization.
See Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology in Its 20th Year, 181 SCIENCE 124 (1973) (community treat-
ment would be impossible without psychotropic medications but drugs' negative side effects deserve
more attention); Engelhardt, Rosen, Freedman & Margolis, Phenothiazines in Prevention of Psychia-
tric Hospitalization, 16 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 98 (1967) (empirical evidence from an eight-
year study of hospitalization rates demonstrating that drug treatment significantly prevents hospitali-
zation); Gittelman, Klein & Pollack, Effects of Psychotropic Drugs on Long-Term Adjustment: A
Review, 5 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGIA 317 (1964) (reviewing empirical studies on effectiveness of drug
treatment and generally concluding that drug treatment may prevent relapses). See generally S. IvER-
sEN & L. IVERSEN, BEHAVIORAL PHARMACOLOGY (2d ed. 1981) (describing how specific drugs affect
specific types of behavior); A. MASON & R. GRANACHER, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC
DRUG THERAPY (1980) (describing principles of antipsychotic drug therapy and its application to
specific types of disorders).
54. See Klerman, supra note 44, at 619; Schulberg & Baker, Community Mental Health: The
Belief System of the 1960's, 6 PSYCHIATRIC OPINION 14 (Apr. 1969); Wagenfeld & Jacobs, supra
note 41, at 48-52; Williams, Bellis & Wellington, supra note 41, at 61-62.
55. See Braun, Kochansky, Shapiro, Greenberg, Gudeman, Johnson & Shore, Overvieu: Deinsti-
tutionalization of Psychiatric Patients, a Critical Review of Outcome Studies, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
736, 747-48 (1981); Moscowitz, The Effectiveless of Day Hospital Treatment: A Review, 8 J. COM-
MUNITY PSYCHOLOGY, 155 (1980); Test & Stein, Community Treatment of the Chronic Patient.- Re-
search Ozerview, 4 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 350, 359-60 (1978).
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ment is likely to continue.58 There remain, however, a number of barriers
to effective community treatment.
5 7
B. Relation Between the Law and Current Mental Health Policy
As a result of deinstitutionalization and community treatment, most
mentally ill persons in the United States spend the majority of their time
in the community.5 The substantial increase in the number of mentally
ill persons now living in the community increases the importance of hold-
ing them to an appropriate standard of care. This determination should be
guided by the dominant mental health treatment policies which have been
adopted-deinstitutionalization and community treatment.
1. An Objective Standard is Appropriate in Determining Primary
Negligence
The mentally ill must be held to a uniform objective standard of tort
liability in order to meet the present requirements and aims of community
treatment. The objective standard helps minimize the burden on the com-
munity from deinstitutionalization, helps foster community acceptance of
56. Braun, Kochansky, Shapiro, Greenberg, Gudeman, Johnsen & Shore, supra note 55, at 748
("qualified affirmative response" has been given to the feasibility of community treatment); Purvis &
Miskimins, Effects of Community Follow-Up on Post-hospital Adjustment of Pychiatric Patients, 6
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 374 (1970) (community treatment essential in increasing commu-
nity adjustment; even brief rehospitalization engenders dependency and inhibits rehabilitation); Test
& Stein, supra note 55, at 360 (community treatment represents most effective treatment currently
available).
57. L. BACHRACH, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: AN ANALYTICAL REVIEW AND SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 12-14 (1977) (reviewing studies citing barriers to effective community treatment: inade-
quate treatment services, community support services, residential alternatives, and community resis-
tance); Estroff, Psychiatric Deinstitutionalization: A Sociocultural Analysis, 37 J. Soc. IssuEs 116,
123-26 (1981) (analyzing economic, clinical, and social reasons for deficiencies in effective community
treatment); Talbott, Toward a Public Policy on the Chronic Mentally Ill Patient, 50 AM. J. OgTHO-
PSYCHIATRY 43, 46-52 (1980) (citing obstacles to successful community treatment and suggesting new
policy and treatment programs); Test, Effective Community Treatment of the Chronically Mentally
Ill: What is Necessary?, 37 J. Soc. IssuEs 71 (1981) (reviewing research on community treatment to
determine what types of services must be provided for successful treatment).
58. Out of an estimated 1,100,000 schizophrenics in the United States, only about 180,000 are
hospitalized, leaving almost a million in the community. While 750,000 psychotic elderly reside in
state hospitals and nursing homes, another one million psychotic elderly live in the community. Fi-
nally, of the total number of severely mentally ill persons in the United States, 1.1 million are institu-
tionalized while 3.1 million are living in the community. See Talbott, supra note 57, at 44; see also
Ozarin, Redick & Taube, A Quarter Century of Psychiatric Care, 1950-1974: A Statistical Review,
27 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 515 (1976) (reporting statistical data reflecting pattern of
change from hospital to community treatment). These figures only represent the most severely dis-
abled and therefore underestimate the total number of mentally ill persons in the community.
While many of those discharged are at some point readmitted to the hospital, on the average they
are institutionalized only four weeks a year. See Minkoff, A Map of the Chronic Mental Patient, in
THE CHRONIC MENTAL PATIENT: PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PUBLIC
POLICY (J. Talbott ed. 1978). Currently only 23% of discharged patients return to their own homes.
See Talbott, supra note 57, at 45.
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the mentally ill, and encourages the mentally ill to become self-sufficient,
responsible members of the community.
a. Community Perspective
Community treatment attempts to reintegrate the mentally ill into the
community as relatively self-sufficient, normal citizens. Discharged mental
patients must therefore be able to obtain follow-up mental health care,
adequate housing, job training, and opportunities to associate with "nor-
mal" persons.5 Local communities, however, have not yet provided such
support services.60 They have sought instead to isolate the mentally ill
through city ordinances, zoning restrictions, and discriminatory employ-
ment practices.61 Since the ultimate success of community treatment de-
pends upon community acceptance and support,"' mental health profes-
59. See L. BACHRACH, supra note 57, at 11-13; Talbott, supra note 57, at 49-52; Test, supra
note 57, at 72-77.
60. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RETURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED TO THE COM-
MUNITY: GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO DO MORE (Jan. 7, 1977). One commentator has noted that "what
is conveniently overlooked is that deinstitutionalization rests on a sine qua non: the presence of an
effective, operative and qualitatively competent community-sponsored network of supportive services."
Silverstein, The Social Consequences of Deinstitutionalization, 11 J. NAT'L ASS'N PRIVATE PSYCHI-
ATRIC Hosps. 12, 12-13 (1979).
61. One of the major obstacles to community treatment has been a growing community resistance
to integration. See Aviram & Segal, Exclusion of the Mentally Ill, 29 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
126, 128-30 (1973) (describing new formal and informal mechanisms of exclusion that communities
have developed to prevent integration of the mentally ill); Kirk & Therrien, Community Mental
Health Myths and the Fate of Former Hospitalized Patients, 38 PSYCHIATRY 209, 212-14 (Aug.
1975) (discussing "myth of reintegration"); Klerman, supra note 44, at 627 (discussing community
pressure to sequester discharged mental patients in special neighborhoods). See generally Sarbin &
Mancuso, Failure of a Moral Enterprise: Attitudes of the Public Toward Mental Illness, 35 J. CON-
SULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 159 (1970) (public still wants to segregate mentally ill).
In many cities, "deviant ghettoes" have emerged which foster degeneration and interpersonal isola-
tion in much the same way as institutions. See A. SCULL, supra note 44, at 153; Estroff, supra note
57, at 116-17; Reich & Seigel, The Emergence of the Bowery as a Psychiatric Dumping Ground, 50
PSYCHIATRIC Q. 191 (1978); The Discharged Chronic Mental Patient: A Medical Issue Becomes a
Political One, MED. WORLD NEWS, Apr. 12, 1974, at 47. Many of today's "homeless" are deinstitu-
tionalized mental patients who wander the streets. See Morganthau, Michael, Camper & Donosky,
Down and Out in America, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1982, at 28-29; Tempest, Millions Hit Bottom in
the Streets, L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 1982, at 24, cols. 2-3 (estimate that the mentally ill make up as
much as 40% of Los Angeles County's estimated 30,000 homeless people).
Some authors suggest that whereas a period of prosperity and political liberalism in 1960's initially
fostered the development of community treatment, current conditions of economic depression and con-
servatism may foster retrenchment and calls for reinstitutionalization. See Klerman, supra note 44, at
619, 627; Williams, Bellis & Wellington, supra note 41, at 61-62.
62. See R. DORWORT & W. MEYERS, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN MENTAL HEALTH (1981)
(noting importance of citizen participation in community mental health programs; evaluating citizen
participation research studies; and recommending methods of fostering citizen participation).
One analyst concluded that "[u]nless [community] opposition is diluted and a balance found be-
tween the interests of the community and the interests of the former patients, the movement has gone
about as far as it can go." Armstrong, Society z'. the Mentally Ill: Exploring the Roots of Prejudice, 29
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 602, 602 (1978).
Studies aimed at identifying the obstacles to effective delivery of community treatment have named,
in addition to fragmentation in programs and funding, attitudes of communities and community lead-
ers, lack of community support systems, lack of employment opportunities, lack of housing alterna-
Tort Liability
sionals are trying to increase community acceptance of the mentally.ill and
to minimize the burden deinstitutionalization places on the community."'
Holding the mentally ill to an objective standard of tort liability facilitates
the achievement of both goals.
Allowing a defense of mental illness to tort liability may increase public
resistance to having the mentally ill in the community. The public's atti-
tudes toward the mentally ill vacillate capriciously" and it takes only a
few well-publicized cases absolving the mentally ill from tort liability to
start a public outcry.65 If the law gives the mentally ill special immunities
from liability for causing harm, then society might well restrict their op-
portunities to create injuries. Opportunities for the mentally ill to obtain
licenses, employment, or housing might be substantially circumscribed."6
tives, and zoning restrictions. See, e.g., THE CHRONIC MENTAL PATIENT: PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PUBLIC POLICY (J. Talbott ed. 1978); GROUP FOR THE ADVANCE-
MENT OF PSYCHIATRY, THE CHRONIC PATIENT IN THE COMMUNITY, REPORT 10 (1978); NA-
TIONAL INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, COMMUNITY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MENTALLY
ILL AND DISABLED: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (1976); 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: MENTAL HEALTH IN AMERICA: 1978 4 (1978);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 60.
Many of the measures recommended in the studies cited above, such as increasing the availability of
mental health services, residential alternatives, and employment opportunities were incorporated in
the Mental Health Systems Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9401 (1980). In addition, recent class action suits have
been brought on behalf of the mentally ill to try to force states and counties to provide adequate
community care alternatives. See, e.g., Brewster v. Dukakis, 675 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (affirming
lower court order implementing consent degree against state of Massachusetts requiring defendants to
make good faith efforts to secure funding for community mental health services); Dixon v. Wein-
berger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that federal and city governments had joint respon-
sibility to provide adequate community care and finding statutory right to treatment in least restrictive
alternative).
63. A number of strategies to increase community acceptance have been suggested. See, e.g., Arm-
strong, supra note 62, at 603-05 (portraying mentally ill favorably in the media); Johannsen, Atti-
tudes Toward Mental Patients: A Review of Empirical Research, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 218, 224-27
(1969) (increasing personal contact with mentally ill persons and educating public); Talbott, supra
note 57, at 50 (developing constituency for mentally ill by educating public about their needs).
There has been a growing recognition of the need to examine the social costs of deinstitutionaliza-
tion and ways in which the burden on the community can be minimized. See Arnhoff, Social Conse-
quences of Policy Toward Mental Illness, 188 SCIENCE 1277 (1975); Test & Stein, Alternative to
Mental Hospital Treatment III: Social Cost, 37 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 409 (1980); Test &
Stein, supra note 55, at 361-62.
64. Even though two of the reasons most often given for the development of community treatment
were the increased community tolerance of deviance and concern for the civil rights of mental patients,
community resistance is today one of the major obstacles confronting effective community treatment.
See generally Sarbin & Mancuso, supra note 61 (thorough review of empirical studies on public
attitudes toward mental illness).
65. A classic, albeit somewhat extreme, example is the aftermath of John Hinckley's insanity
acquittal for the assassination attempt on President Reagan. Hinckley's acquittal resulted in numer-
ous media discussions regarding abolition of the insanity defense. See The Insanity Plea on Trial,
NEWSWEEK, May 24, 1982, at 56. The Hinckley verdict also led to proposed legislation limiting the
insanity defense in the federal courts and providing for mandatory commitment of acquittees. See S.
153, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (mandatory commitment of acquittees); S. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983) (limiting availability of insanity defense).
66. For example, assume the mentally ill were given tort immunity. In automobile collision cases
where the defendant is a released mental patient, insurance companies might raise a defense of in-
sanity on the driver's part to avoid having to pay the claim (whether the insured wanted to raise the
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Finally, such immunity would probably exacerbate the problems of social
segregation and stigmatization of the mentally ill, since such immunity
effectively labels them as a special class of irresponsible, incompetent per-
sons that the general community would wish to avoid.8 7
An important consideration in minimizing the community burden of
deinstitutionalization is the impact of the law on the total number of torts
committed. Since deinstitutionalization has significantly increased the
number of mentally ill persons in the community, it will also probably
increase the number of torts they, as a class, commit.68 One of the pur-
poses of tort law is to encourage people to prevent accidents from occur-
ring." Just as holding average persons liable for their torts may make
them behave more conscientiously, holding the mentally ill liable may
have a similar effect.70 If the mentally ill are not held responsible for their
defense or not). See Alexander & Szasz, supra note 3, at 38. The public may respond by advocating
for stricter restrictions on the issuance of driver's licenses to discharged mental patients.
The same reasoning can be extended to other areas. Employers might be more reluctant to hire ex-
mental patients who could claim immunity for causing injuries to other employees or accidents on thejob. Similarly, landlords might be more hesitant to rent to former mental patients. In Samson v.
Saginaw Professional Bldg., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975), three dissenting justices stated:
"In requiring landlords to treat with suspicion persons who formerly suffered mental illness even after
mental health officials have certified them ready to resume life in the community, this Court under-
mines this salutory and humanitarian advance [i.e., community treatment] and perpetuates the isola-
tion of the mentally ill." Id. at 416, 224 N.W.2d at 853.
67. See Alexander & Szasz, supra note 3, at 36 ("[M]entally healthy persons may be expected to
avoid dealing with mentally sick ones. . . if the mentally sick are held harmless when they injure.").
68. There have been no studies or statistics reported regarding whether deinstitutionalization has
increased the number of torts committed. Studies of crime and arrests among released mental patients,
however, show a possible increased risk of crime committed by released mental patients. See Rabkin,
Criminal Behavior of Discharged Mental Patients: A Critical Appraisal of the Research, 86 PSYCHO-
LOGICAL BULL. 1 (1979); Sosowsky, Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients Reconsidered in
View of the New Legal Relationship Between the State and the Mentally Ill, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
33 (1978); Steadman, Cocozza & Melick, Explaining the Increased Arrest Rate Among Mental Pa-
tients: The Changing Clientele of State Hospitals, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 816 (1978). Thus it might
be suggested that if the discharged mentally ill are more likely to commit crimes, they may also be
more likely to commit torts. Attempts to identify accident-prone individuals also suggest that persons
exhibiting unstable emotional or mental characteristics may be more likely to be accident prone. See
James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REv. 769, 773-75 (1950);
Maloney & Rish, The Accident-Prone Driver: The Automotive Age's Biggest Unsolved Problem, 14 U.
FLA. L. REV. 364, 371-74 (1962); Tillmann & Hobbs, The Accident-Prone Automobile Driver: A
Study of the Psychiatric and Social Background, 106 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 321 (1949).
69. Originally, this was the principal objective of the tort law, although the law has increasingly
tended to focus on the need to compensate victims. See W. PROSSR, supra note 27, § 5 at 23, § 83 at
551.
70. The admonitory objective of tort law is not dependent purely on monetary judgments. The
knowledge that one will be confronted with a lawsuit, placed in the position of a defendant, and
possibly faced with a judgment of liability is expected to motivate a person to exercise additional care.
This may be an even more effective deterrent in the case of the mentally ill since they are often
especially fearful of going to court, having generally experienced courtroom proceedings in connection
with involuntary commitment. See Splane, Role and Function of the Attorney in Civil Commitment
179 (1981) (unpublished doctoral dissertation) (mentally ill clients are reported to be afraid of court
appearance even when told likely result is release from involuntary hospitalization).
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torts, the community might become concerned that such immunity would
result in an increased number of torts.
Correspondingly, if the mentally ill were allowed to escape tort liabil-
ity, there is a risk that the public might become outraged by the perceived
injustice of denying compensation to innocent victims.71 This is the com-
pensation rationale most often cited by the courts. And although many
mentally ill defendants are likely to be judgment proof,72 victims should
not be denied compensation in those cases where there is insurance to
cover the judgment or where the defendant has the means to pay.7 3
Ultimately, the important point is not the mentally ill person's ability to
pay, but the symbolic act of holding the person liable regardless of his or
her ability to pay. Otherwise society will be treating the mentally ill as a
special sub-class of inept citizens who cannot be blamed or held accounta-
ble for socially undesirable conduct."'
b. Individual Perspective
Deinstitutionalization assumes that with adequate support services the
mentally ill will be able to function competently in the community. It is
important not only to the community at large but also to the deinstitution-
alized mentally ill that the latter be regarded as fully responsible members
of the community rather than as a special class of incompetents.7 5 Conse-
71. While the public might warily tolerate the immunity of a small class of tortfeasors, it is likely
that public tolerance for the class immunity will decrease as the social cost of accidents rises.
72. Current figures indicate that between 30% and 50% of discharged patients return to work.
However, 70% of them return to less skilled jobs and only 20% to 30% are still employed after one
year. Talbott, supra note 57, at 45. Similar employment statistics are reported in Anthony, Cohen &
Vitalo, supra note 51, at 367-68. In any event, a defendant's wealth or ability to pay tort damages is
immaterial to legal liability. P. ATIYAH, ACCIDEN'rS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 232 (1970).
Moreover, it is in general difficult to recover tort damages from individual defendants. Id. at 240.
73. In general, it has been noted that in the majority of tort cases, tort damages are not paid by
the individual tortfeasor but from some other source. P. ATIYAH, supra note 72, at 240, 255. Automo-
bile and workplace accidents, which are generally covered by insurance, appear to dominate the tort
system. Id. at 25. A survey of automobile accident costs and compensation, for example, found that
fewer than 3% of plaintiffs received any payment from individual tortfeasors. A. CONRAD, J. MOR-
GAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 221
(1964).
74. See Alexander & Szasz, supra note 3, at 35 (stating that to deny a person the legal capacity to
commit intentional acts denies their status as full-fledged human beings; such persons can neither be
blamed nor credited for their actions).
75. There is a growing body of psychological research that the stigma attached to the label of
mental illness can affect a person's self-perception and interpersonal relations, as well as the response
of society in general. See, e.g., Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. L. BULL 101,
123-24 (1971) (ex-convicts find jobs more quickly than ex-mental patients); Farina, Glicha,
Boudreau, Allen & Sherman, Mental Illness and the Impact of Believing Others Knwuo About It, 77 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1971) (believing others to be aware of their status as mentally ill caused
persons to feel less appreciated, appear more tense, and to find performance tasks more difficult);
Farina, Holland & Ring, Role of Stigma and Set in Interpersonal Interaction, 71 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOLOGY 421 (1966) (mentally ill persons described as less desirable as friends and neighbors
than criminals); Johannsen, supra note 63, at 222-23 ("Society's attitudes toward the mentally ill
have a demonstrable effect on how patients see themselves and how adequately they adjust."); Sarbin
& Mancusco, supra note 61, at 159 ("[T]he public tends to be more tolerant of deviant conduct when
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quently, the law should not adopt a tort standard which tells both the
returning mental patient and society that the mentally ill are considered
incapable of behaving in a reasonable, responsible manner.76
Critics of the common law tort doctrine contend that the objective stan-
dard unjustly imposes a form of strict liability upon the mentally ill. This
argument, however, makes the untenable assumption that the mentally ill
have no capacity to conform to the law or to control their behavior.7 The
introduction of psychotropic medications has greatly facilitated the control
of psychotic behavior." Two-thirds of deinstitutionalized patients never
become severely symptomatic. 9 Although severe mental illness does exist,
the gravely mentally ill are the most likely to be institutionalized, and the
least likely to be in the community committing torts.80 With psychotropic
medications and outpatient therapy, most mentally ill persons in the com-
munity can conduct themselves in accord with minimally acceptable be-
havioral standards.8"
Holding the mentally ill to an objective standard does not work an "ex-
traordinary injustice" upon them, as critics claim. The mentally ill are not
by definition incapable of conforming to a reasonable person standard.
Moreover, the whole aim of community treatment is to foster and en-
courage the mentally ill to behave "reasonably" and "normally" in the
community."2 The objective standard is no more unjust to the mentally ill
than it is to numerous other persons whose individual capacities do not
quite match up to the capacities of the "ideal prudent person."83
it is not described with mental illness labels."). See generally T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL A
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1966) (presenting comprehensive labelling theory of mental illness).
76. It has been suggested that the law's treatment of the mentally ill may have a significant effect
in determining the public's opinion towards the mentally ill. See Johannsen, supra note 63, at 222,
227.
77. As the fault principle has evolved, it has become less a concept of moral blame and more an
objective societal judgment as to what constitutes adequate or prudent conduct. Mistakes or good
intentions are not exculpating factors when negligent conduct harms another. See Alexander & Szasz,
supra note 3, at 28-35. See generally W. PROssER, supra note 27, at 18-19 (liability based on social
fault not moral blameworthiness). Therefore, arguing that the mentally ill are somehow morally
blameless is not sufficient justification for exculpating them when their negligent conduct has harmed
another.
78. See supra note 53.
79. See Talbott, supra note 57, at 45.
80. State hospitals still function to confine and treat the most severely disturbed and troublesome
of the mentally ill. See Morrissey, supra note 41, at 163-64.
81. Released mental patients may have to be periodically readmitted to the hospital for short
periods. They spend the majority of their time, however, in the community. See supra note 58.
82. Critics-had faulted institutional treatment for creating an environment in which the patient
had no responsibilities and thereby fostering dependency and degeneration. See supra pp. 161-62.
83. Exceptions have been made to the general rule of applying an objective standard for the physi-
cally disabled and children. Such persons, however, can be distinguished from the mentally ill. First,
they are clearly recognizable and thus provide notice to potential victims. Second, there exists a wider
basis of experience and knowledge upon which to determine what can be reasonably expected from
children and the physically disabled, thus making the problems of proof far less substantial than in
the case of mental illness. See generally Seidelson, supra note 3 (discussing relation between notice
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A final practical consideration should be noted. A defense of mental
illness to a tort action could have undesirable, collateral effects for the
released mental patient."' If a person's mental illness were considered suf-
ficient to excuse him or her from tort liability, then society might consider
it sufficient to warrant commitment to a mental institution. 5 Even if com-
mitment were not deemed warranted, the person might still be vulnerable
to having a guardian or conservator appointed, thus hampering the devel-
opment of personal independence and self-reliance.8 6
2. An Objective Standard is Appropriate in Determining Contribu-
tory Negligence
The arguments favoring an objective standard for the mentally ill in
primary negligence cases equally support an objective standard in deter-
mining contributory negligence. There are no clearly articulated policy
rationales for using a subjective standard in cases involving mentally ill
plaintiffs, 7 although one rationale is that mentally ill plaintiffs are less
threatening to the public and evoke more sympathy than mentally ill de-
fendants. The validity of this assertion is open to serious doubt. The in-
creased number of mentally ill in the community is likely to lead to an
increase in the number of mentally ill persons involved in accidents. The
public is likely to be dismayed if it becomes apparent through tort cases
that they are expected to keep a "special eye" out for the safety of the
mentally ill. If mentally ill persons, who have contributed significantly to
causing their own injuries, are allowed to recover total damages, then the
and reasonable expectations and use of the subjective standard in tort law). Finally, children are held
to the adult reasonable person standard when they engage in adult activities. See, e.g., Dellwo v.
Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 197 N.W.2d 859 (1961) (12-year-old driving a motor boat); Reiszel v.
Fontana, 35 A.D.2d 74, 312 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1970) (17-year-old driver held to adult standard while
11-year-old bicyclist held to standard of care of a reasonable 11-year-old); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 283A comment c, at 14 (1965) (stating that standard of conduct for a child is that of "a
reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under similar circumstances").
84. Critics assert the stigma would prevent normal persons from feigning mental illness. It is
unclear why they feel a defense of mental illness would be any more attractive to the discharged
mental patient, who may suffer even greater negative social consequences from such a defense.
85. It has been pointed out that the defense of insanity is generally only used in cases of serious
crimes because acquittees often draw longer "sentences" in mental hospitals than if they had been
convicted. See Burt, Of Mad Dogs and Scientists: The Perils of the "Criminal-Insane," 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 258, 261 (1974). Alexander and Szasz suggest a similar fate might befall persons accused of civil
wrongs and that such an outcome "is perhaps the main deterrent to extending the 'logic' of mental
irresponsibility from the sphere of crimes to that of torts." Alexander & Szasz, supra note 3, at 38.
86. A person may lose numerous rights as a result of having a guardian or conservator appointed.
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5357-58 (West Supp. 1977) (conservatee may be denied
right to drive, enter contracts, consent to medical treatment, and conservator may place conservatee in
a psychiatric or medical facility); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 77.19, 77.25 (McKinney 1979) (giv-
ing conservator power to control conservatee's property and assets and to void contracts, but not to
deny any civil right solely because of conservatorship). See generally Pickering, Limitations on Indi-
vidual Rights in California Incoinpetency Proceedings, 7 U.C.D. L. REv. 457 (1974).
87. See supra p. 157.
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public is in effect being charged for not exercising greater care for their
safety than for the average person. This could result in especially negative
consequences in such areas as housing or employment. Employers would
have an added justification not to hire discharged mental patients, and
landlords not to rent to them, if the mentally ill could contribute to caus-
ing their own injuries and then recover complete damages.""
It has also been suggested that allowing a subjective standard for men-
tally ill plaintiffs provides a means of mitigating the generally harsh re-
sults of the contributory negligence doctrine. Such a standard, however,
singles out the mentally ill as a distinct class of incompetents requiring
heightened protection. The mentally ill living in the community are ex-
pected to take care of their own basic needs including the need to look out
for their own safety. It is no more unfair or inequitable to require them to
exercise due care for their own safety than it is for the average person.
CONCLUSION
The aim of community treatment is to integrate discharged mental pa-
tients into the community as responsible and independent functioning
members. Attainment of this goal requires that the mentally ill be treated
as ordinary citizens. Hence, they should be held to the same standards of
tort liability which apply to the rest of society. This Note has sought to
demonstrate that the use of a subjective standard in primary negligence
cases, rather than being a humanitarian reform, would actually run
counter to current mental health policy and would work to the decided
disadvantage of the mentally ill. Similarly, the current use of the subjec-
tive standard in determining contributory negligence is inappropriate and
should be replaced by the objective standard.
-Stephanie I. Splane
88. As noted, a large number of accidents occur at the place of work or at home. See supra note
73. Employers and landlords, however, may opt out of any potential liability simply by refusing to
hire or rent to the mentally ill. In cases where the employee is covered by workmen's compensation,
which is generally based on strict liability, an employer can raise a form of contributory negligence
defense in about half the states, i.e. unreasonable failure to observe safety rules or to use safety de-
vices. 1A A. LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 33 (1952 & Supp. 1982). It does not
seem to have been decided how this applies against mentally ill employees. However, it would seem
that if it was determined ihat the mentally ill should be given the benefit of a subjective standard
across the board that employers would be barred from this defense. See generally Hanson Buick, Inc.
v. Chatham, 292 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (workmen's compensation not allowed for psychic
trauma precipitated by psychic stimulus because allowing compensation would encourage employers,
afraid of having to pay out disability benefits, not to hire "persons of delicate psychic constitution");
Johannsen, supra note 63, at 221 (employers express practical concerns over hiring ex-patients, in-
cluding belief that insurance carriers might raise rates or refuse coverage for employers of former
patients).
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